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EMPTY RHETORIC : THE FAILINGS OF THE LCIA’S ETHICAL RULES FOR LEGAL COUNSEL
AND ALTERNATIVES
By
Christina Bustos*
I. INTRODUCTION
Ethics in international arbitration is a daunting gray area for insiders as well as
outsiders.1 Recently, arbitrator ethics has garnered significant attention from the
international community.2 On the sidelines, however, there has also been discussion of
legal counsel ethics.
In the past, ethical rules were largely unnecessary because international
arbitration proceedings were relatively infrequent, European-dominated, and
predominantly “gentleman’s agreements” rather than true legal resolutions.3 Modern
international arbitration, conversely, is becoming increasingly popular as a method for
dispute resolution and is truly international in scope,4 with arbitrating parties often having
no prior relationship or even sharing a common culture.5 As a result, more parties are
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See Nathan M. Crystal & Francesca Giannoni-Crystal, “One, No one and One Hundred Thousand”…
Which Ethical Rule to Apply? Conflict of Ethical Rules in International Arbitration, 32 M ISS . C. L. R EV .
283, 318 (2013); see Sundaresh Menon, Some Cautionary Notes for an Age of Opportunity, 79 A RB . 393
(2013); see Doak Bishop & Margrete Stevens, The Compelling Need for a Code of Ethics in International
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(2014).
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being exposed to or themselves engaging in “guerilla tactics” in arbitration6 which can
result in inefficient, unpredictable, and illegitimate adjudication.7
In response to these issues, arbitral institutions have begun developing ethical
guidelines for arbitration proceedings. One such institution is the London International
Court of Arbitration (hereinafter “LCIA”), which included in its newly enacted rules an
“Annex for Legal Representatives” that enumerates several ethical guidelines for legal
counsel engaging in LCIA arbitration.8
In addition to the new Annex set forth by the LCIA, the International Bar
Association (hereinafter “IBA”) has also noted the need for regulation of legal counsel
ethics in the context of arbitration, as demonstrated by its own set of ethical guidelines
for legal counsel.9 Although both the LCIA Annex and the IBA’s ethical guidelines
provide a preliminary step for regulation, both fall short in addressing the core ethical
issues persistent amongst legal counsel, including counsel engaging in guerilla tactics and
confusion as to which ethical rules apply. There are four main flaws in the language of
the LCIA Annex that seem to reveal weakness in the ideology behind the Annex.10 Even
though the ideology behind the IBA Guidelines is more comprehensive than the LCIA
Annex, it seems to be similarly flawed because it lacks authoritative language and
provides rules that are vague at best.11
Many scholars, counselors, and clients are opposed to increased ethical
regulation.12 The International Court of Arbitration (hereinafter “ICC”) as an arbitration
forum, for example, does not articulate any ethical rules whatsoever, and its
overwhelming popularity may be partly due to an aversion to increased ethical
regulations.13 Still, lawyers are increasingly acknowledging the negative consequences a
lack of ethical guidelines may have in international arbitration as a whole.14 Legal
6

Edna Sussman and Solomon Ebere, All’s Fair in Love and War – Or is it? Reflections on Ethical
Standards for Counsel in International Arbitration, 22 A M . R EV . INT’L A RB . 611, 615 (Guerilla tactics
include running the clock, last-minute surprise tactics like introducing important arguments or affidavits for
the first time on the “eve of the hearing,” and “abusing the arbitrators after a bifurcated hearing on liability
in order to try to keep down the amount of damages on the quantum hearing.”)
7
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LCIA’s newly adopted Arbitration Rules came into effect October 1, 2014.
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scholars have identified two major concepts as ethical challenges facing counsel: “double
deontology” and “inequality-of-arms.”15
Significant deficiencies exist in international arbitration regarding counsel ethics.
More regulation will ensure stability, integrity, and efficiency for parties seeking
arbitration. Legal scholars and practitioners have come up with several proposals,
including a third party uniform code of ethical regulations and a “parties’ agreement.”16
While there is no perfect solution, an individualized “parties’ agreement”17 would be an
effective and realistic approach to the current situation because both parties’ counsel will
have a full understanding of exactly what they can and cannot do, resulting in a leveling
of the playing field, curtailment of guerrilla tactics, increased legitimacy, and overall
more efficient arbitral proceedings.
II.  THE NEED FOR ETHICAL GUIDELINES
A.  The Difference of Legal Values Across Cultures
The question of whether ethical rules for legal counsel are needed in arbitration
remains a contested issue. Some international arbitration experts do not believe any
additional rules are necessary because “the international arbitration bar has the reputation
of being a quite civilized and ethical bar.”18 This positive reputation, however, may have
only been a reality in the past, when international arbitration was a “niche way to resolve
controversies.”19 Before the New York Arbitration Convention in 1958 allowed for
expansion of international arbitration forums, international arbitration was “very
European – and civil-law dominated – because of the location of the International
Chamber of Commerce.”20 With this common background and familiarity between
parties, any cultural disparities were typically resolved by “gentlemen’s agreements”
rather than legal determinations.21

15

See Sussman & Ebere, supra note 6 at 615.

16

A parties agreement refers to an arrangement that is constructed by and accepted by all parties to a
transaction.
17

Id.
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Crystal & Giannoni-Crystal, supra note 1, at 286.
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See George M. von Mehren & Alana C. Jochum, Is International Arbitration Becoming Too American?,
2 G LOBAL B US. L. R EV . 47, 49-52 (2011); The International Chamber of Commerce is based in France, and
was based in France in 1958 as well.
21

Crystal & Giannoni-Crystal, supra note 1, at 286.
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Since the creation of the New York Arbitration Convention, international
arbitration has evolved and dramatically expanded.22 Now, arbitration has become the
most popular way to solve international disputes, and its popularity is not confined to
Europe; it is utilized globally.23 Statistics indicate that over 80% of parties in pending
LCIA cases are from outside of the United Kingdom, echoing a larger trend of “crossborder” arbitration.24 International arbitration has become “culturally delocalized” in
nature.25 Globalization signifies that “gentlemen’s agreements” may no longer suffice to
resolve cultural differences.26 For example: “in civil law countries, witnesses are not
prepared. Instead, the lawyer will nominate a witness for a particular topic and then argue
the significance of that testimony.”27 In Germany, “contacting non-party witnesses is
actually unethical.”28
Differences in legal cultures across borders can be significant. A few of the key
difference include rules regarding witness preparation, rules dealing with client
communications, and the divergence in the relationship between fellow lawyers.29 The
“clash between national ethical rules relating to pre-testimonial contact with [the]
witness” is the “seminal and most familiar example used to illustrate the need for
international ethical rules.”30 In the United States, it is common practice for lawyers to
prepare their witness to testify, but in many European countries such conduct is
improper.31 In England, for instance, the Barristers’ Code of Conduct prohibits any

22

Crystal & Giannoni-Crystal, supra note 1, at 286.
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Id. at 286-287.

24
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Arbitration,

available

at

rehearsal, practice, or coaching of a witness.32 In civil law countries, “witness
preparation is generally even more restricted than in England, and often includes
additional regulations and more stringent standards.”33 In the United States, client
communication is one of the most fundamental duties of the attorney.34 The broad duty
to maintain client communication is considered to be essential to fair and comprehensive
representation.35 Conversely, the French doctrine sous la foi du Palais36 necessitates that
an attorney may be required to keep confidential from his client communication from
opposing counsel under certain circumstances.37 In addition, a similar rule in Italy
provides, “the correspondence that have been qualified as ‘confidential’ and any
correspondence containing a settlement proposal cannot be produced at trial or referred
to.”38
Another example of ethical discrepancies in legal values is the divergence in the
relationship between lawyers. The United States, for example, does not articulate any
formal type of code of civility between lawyers.39 It is uncommon for lawyers operating
under the professional and ethical codes in the United States to be sanctioned for uncivil
behavior toward each other.40 The relationship between lawyers, however, is more
heavily regulated in Europe than in the United States. 41 For example, Article 23 of the
Italian Code of Ethics states: “in litigation an attorney must inspire his or her conduct to
32

Barristers’ Code of Conduct R. 705, available at https://www.barstandardsboard.org.uk/regulatoryrequirements/the-code-of-conduct/part-vii-conduct-of-work-by-practising-barristers/#contact. (“A barrister
must not:
(a)   rehearse practice or coach a witness in relation to his evidence;
(b)   encourage a witness to give evidence which is untruthful or which is not the whole truth;
(c)   except with the consent of the representative for the opposing side or of the Court, communicate
directly or indirectly about a case with any witness, whether or not the witness is his law client,
once that witness has begun to give evidence of that witness has been concluded.”).
33

Crystal & Giannoni-Crystal, supra note 1, at 295 (citing Germany and France as examples of civil law
countries with more restrictions than England).
34

Crystal & Giannoni-Crystal, supra note 1, at 296.
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Id.
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“Sous la foi du Palais” literally translates to “evidence on Palace” but refers to confidentiality of counsel
communication.
37

Rogers, supra note 2.

38

Italian Code of Conduct, Article 28.

39

While there are no formal codes of civility between lawyers in the United States, arguably informal codes
of conduct exist.
40

Crystal & Giannoni-Crystal, supra note 1, at 297-298.
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Crystal & Giannoni-Crystal, supra note 1, at 298; see generally CCBE Code of Ethics art. 5.1-5.9.
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the duty of defense but without affecting as far as possible the comradeship among
lawyers.”42 Put another way, lawyers from Italy will be under an obligation to promote
comradeship and civility between themselves and opposing counsel, whereas lawyers
from the United States will be under no such formal obligation.43
B. The Rise of Guerilla Tactics
Because legal cultures can be highly distinctive, international arbitration forums
often do not articulate uniform ethical rules for counsel to adhere to.44 Failing to address
this problem, however, can have negative implications. To gauge if counsel were taking
advantage of a lack of ethical regulation, in 2011 the IBA’s Arbitration Committee45
issued a survey regarding counsel ethics (hereinafter “IBA Survey”).46 The survey asked
the following two questions:
1.  
2.  

As counsel in an arbitration or as an arbitrator, did you ever feel like
one or both parties engaged in what you would call guerrilla tactics,
whether technically unethical or not.
If your answer was yes, please describe a tactic you regarded as a
guerrilla tactic.47

There were 81 responders to the survey, and fifty-five, or 68%, checked “yes” and
reported that they had experienced what they considered to be guerrilla tactics.48 The
most prevalent categories of guerrilla tactics responders identified were: (1) frustrating an
orderly and fair hearing, (2) document production/disclosure, and (3) lack of respect,
courtesy towards tribunal and opposing counsel.49 Guerrilla tactics such as these seem to
be on the rise.50 International arbitration experts Edna Sussman and Solomon Ebere point
out that, “in the past months we have seen reports of the arrest of a successful claimant by
42

Italian Code of Ethics, Article 23.

43

See generally Crystal & Giannoni-Crystal, supra note 1.

44

See generally INTERNATIONAL CHAMBER OF COMMERCE RULES OF ARBITRATION (2012).

45

In 2008 the IBA Arbitration Committee formed a Task Force on Counsel Ethics in International
Arbitration. The Task Force’s goal was to find out if the lack of guidelines for counsel ethics has had an
effect on the fairness and the integrity of arbitration proceedings in the past.
46

Sussman & Ebere, supra note 8, at 611.

47

Id.

48

Sussman & Ebere, supra note 8, at 612.

49

Sussman & Ebere, supra note 8, at 613.

50

Id.
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a host state, fraudulent overstatement by over one billion dollars in a balance sheet
submitted in arbitration, death threats against witnesses, and ex parte meetings of counsel
for plaintiffs with the court-appointed ‘independent’ expert to plan and write the expert’s
report.”51
The lack of ethical regulation for counsel in international arbitration creates an
“uneven playing field” which seems to encourage guerrilla tactics and, as a result,
threatens efficiency, which is one of the key benefits of engaging in arbitration, by
making the proceedings inefficient, unpredictable, and illegitimate.52
IIII. THE CHANGES TO THE LCIA ARBITRATION RULES AND IBA GUIDELINES FOR PARTY
REPRESENTATION
On October 1, 2014 the LCIA’s new rules became effective. The previous rules
did not contain any ethical rules for legal counsel.53 An Annex was added to provide
“General Guidelines for the Parties’ Legal Representatives.” The Annex is made up of
seven sections:
Paragraph 1: These general guidelines are intended to promote the good
and equal conduct of the parties’ legal representatives appearing by name
within the arbitration. Nothing in these guidelines is intended to derogate
from the Arbitration Agreement or to undermine any legal representative’s
primary duty of loyalty to the party represented in the arbitration or the
obligation to present that party’s case effectively to the Arbitral Tribunal.
Nor shall these guidelines derogate from any mandatory law, rules of law,
professional rules or codes of conduct if and to the extend that any are
shown to apply to a legal representative appearing in the arbitration.54
Paragraph 2: A legal representative should not engage in activities
intended unfairly to obstruct the arbitration or to jeopardise the finality of
any award, including repeated challenges to an arbitrator’s appointment or
to the jurisdiction or authority of the Arbitral Tribunal known to be
unfounded by that legal representative.55
51

Sussman & Ebere, supra note 4, at 613; see Sebastian Perry, ISCID Claimant Behind Bars on Bribery
Charge, Global Arb. Rev. (2010); see Venture Global Engineering v. Satyam Computer Services Ltd., No.
9238, 2010 (Sup. Ct. India); see Znamensky Selekcionno-Gibridny Center LLC v. Donaldson International
Livestock Ltd., 2009 CanLII 51197 (Ont. S.C.); see In re Application of Chevron Corporation et al., 709
F.Supp.2d 283 (S.D.N.Y. 2010).
52

Park, supra note 1, at 412.
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The LCIA’s previous rules were promulgated in 1998 (http://www.lcia.org/LCIA/history.aspx).
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LONDON COURT OF INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION R. APP. ¶ 1 (2014).
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Paragraph 3: A legal representative should not knowingly make any false
statement to the Arbitral Tribunal or the LCIA Court.56
Paragraph 4: A legal representative should not knowingly procure or assist
in the preparation of or rely upon any false evidence presented to the
Arbitral Tribunal or the LCIA Court.57
Paragraph 5: A legal representative should not knowingly conceal or assist
in the concealment in the concealment of any document (or any part
thereof) which is ordered to be produced by the Arbitral Tribunal.58
Paragraph 6: During the arbitration proceedings, a legal representative
should not deliberately initiate or attempt to initiate with any member of
the Arbitral Tribunal or with any member of the LCIA Court making any
determination or decision in regard to the arbitration (but not including the
Registrar) any unilateral contact relating to the arbitration or the parties’
dispute, which has not been disclosed in writing prior or shortly after the
time of such contact to all other parties, all members of the Arbitral
Tribunal (if comprised of more than one arbitrator) and the Registrar in
accordance with Articles 13.4.59
Paragraph 7: In accordance with Articles 18.5 and 18.6, the Arbitral
Tribunal may decide whether a legal representative has violated these
general guidelines and, if so, how to exercise its discretion to impose any
or all of the sanctions listed in Article 18.6.60
These guidelines are intended to be binding for all LCIA Arbitration proceedings.
In 2013, the IBA Guidelines on Party Representation were adopted. The IBA
Guidelines provide 27 rules for counsel, along with comments, divided into seven
sections.61 Those sections are: Application of Guidelines, Party Representation,
Communication with Arbitrators, Submissions to the Arbitral Tribunal, Information
Exchange and Disclosure, Witnesses and Experts, and Remedies for Misconduct.62
56  

LONDON COURT OF INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION R. APP. ¶ 3 (2014).

57  

LONDON COURT OF INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION R. APP. ¶ 4 (2014).

58  

LONDON COURT OF INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION R. APP. ¶ 5 (2014).

59  

LONDON COURT OF INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION R. APP. ¶ 6 (2014).

60  

LONDON COURT OF INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION R. APP. ¶ 7 (2014).

61  

INTERNATIONAL BAR ASSOCIATION GUIDELINES ON PARTY REPRESENTATION (2013).

62

Id.
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These guidelines do not govern all arbitration proceedings within the IBA, but if all
parties agree, they can consent for the guidelines to apply to their proceedings.63
Comparing the IBA Guidelines with the LCIA Annex illustrates the existing ethics
framework for counsel in international arbitration.
A.  Four Flaws in the Language of the LCIA’s New Annex
1.   “Should Not” Instead of “Will Not”
The Annex states that legal representatives “should not” engage or fail to engage
in prohibited activities.64 The language makes the rules seem like a suggestion rather
than a mandatory set of ethics parties must oblige by. The use of the verb “should”
signals that the rules are “merely precatory.”65 If legal counsel violates the rules of the
Annex, he or she could certainly point to the language of the rules to support a
proposition that the rules are mere recommendations for ethical conduct rather than
mandatory Rules that can be sanctioned. The IBA Guidelines provide similarly weak
verbiage, using the word “should” rather than “must.”66
2.   Disclaimer Language in Paragraph 1
Paragraph 1 states that the rules are not meant to derogate any obligation the legal
counsel has to the client, and similarly not meant to derogate any other rule or code of
conduct that applies to legal counsel.67 This signals to counsel that as long as their
actions demonstrate either an effort to best represent their client or an effort to comply
with another outside set of rules, they are not violating LCIA rules.68 Differing sets of
laws, professional rules of conduct, and ethical rules exist in the global legal community,
and are available to justify counsel’s conduct. Similarly, many types of conduct that
could be considered unethical could easily be construed to represent an effort to most
effectively and efficiently represent a client in arbitration proceedings. Thus, lawyers
that violate these provisions may use this paragraph as an escape clause to avoid
sanctions.

63

INTERNATIONAL BAR ASSOCIATION GUIDELINES ON PARTY REPRESENTATION (2013).

64

See generally LONDON COURT OF INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION R. APP. (2014).

65

Crystal & Giannoni-Crystal, supra note 1, at 297.

66  

See generally INTERNATIONAL BAR ASSOCIATION GUIDELINES ON PARTY REPRESENTATION (2013).

67  

LONDON COURT OF INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION R. APP. ¶ 1 (2014).

68

Id.
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3.   Lack of Detail and Comprehensiveness
The Annex articulates five specific activities that are prohibited, which signals to
legal counsel that his or her ethical obligations are limited to those five activities.69
Comprehensive ethical rules are essential to effectiveness.70 Conversely, the IBA
Guidelines articulate not five rules, but 27 rules in its guidelines for legal
representatives.71 For example, the IBA’s Guidelines include sets of rules to preserve
witness integrity72 as well as rules that obligate legal representation to report any conflict
in interest before the arbitration begins as well as during the arbitration proceedings.73
Yet, some crucial detail remains left out. For example, Paragraph 5 states that legal
counsel may not conceal any document ordered to be produced by the tribunal.74 What if
the tribunal fails to order production of a document, but production of that document is
crucial to the integrity of the proceedings? Legal counsel may not feel they are ethically
required to produce those types of documents. By the same measure, Paragraph 5 uses
the word “documents,” not evidence.75 Accordingly, it’s unclear whether the same rules
apply to non-documentary evidence. The LCIA Annex fails to establish a
comprehensive, detailed ethical framework for legal counsel to adhere to. Instead the
Annex creates ethical loopholes.
4.   Lack of Real, Substantial Sanctions
Rules that cannot be enforced have limited value.76 This wisdom rings true with
the sanctions set out in the LCIA. The sanctions referred to in Paragraph 7 come from
the main body of the LCIA rules and can be summed up as four sanctions: (1) written
reprimand, (2) written caution as to future conduct, (3) reference to the legal
representative’s regulation and/or professional body, and (4) any other measures deemed
necessary by the tribunal to maintain its general duties.77 The first two sanctions, written
69

LONDON COURT OF INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION R. APP. (2014).

70

See generally Menon, supra note 1.

71  

INTERNATIONAL BAR ASSOCIATION GUIDELINES ON PARTY REPRESENTATION (2013).

72  

INTERNATIONAL BAR ASSOCIATION GUIDELINES ON PARTY REPRESENTATION R. 18 – 25 (2013).

73  

INTERNATIONAL BAR ASSOCIATION GUIDELINES ON PARTY REPRESENTATION R. 4-6 (2013).

74  

LONDON COURT OF INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION R. APP. ¶ 5 (2014).

75  

LONDON COURT OF INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION R. APP. ¶ 5 (2014).

76

Jeffrey Waincymer, Regulatory Developments in the Control of Counsel in International Arbitration –
The IBA Guidelines on Party Representation in International Arbitration and the New LCIA Rules and
Annex, 30 A RB . INT ’L . at 517 (2014).
77

LONDON COURT OF INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION R. APP. (2014).
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reprimand and caution to future conduct, are ineffectual.78 The threat of a warning with
no other sanction will likely not deter legal counsel from engaging in unethical conduct.
The third sanction exists independent of Paragraph 7, so it will likely be unproductive as
well.79 The last sanction, however, because of its broad language and discretion, could
allow for meaningful sanctions. Unfortunately, the arbitrators with the discretion to
impose sanctions are party-appointed. Therefore, arbitrators are unlikely to implicate the
parties that chose them because sanctions would likely destroy any future relationship.80
Arbitrators and arbitration forums need parties to select them. Therefore, they are not
likely to harshly penalize parties for ethical wrongdoing, especially if the problem is
caused by a cultural misunderstanding rather than foul play.
V. REACTIONS AND RAMIFICATIONS
The new LCIA Annex has sparked wide discussion in the legal community on
what effect the Annex will have in the coming years. The response by the international
arbitration community seems to be overwhelmingly positive, which is not surprising
considering this is the first time an arbitral institution has included provisions specifically
governing the conduct of counsel.81 The general consensus is that the LCIA Annex is
beneficial because it offers more clear direction as to which actions can be taken by legal
counsel during arbitration and which actions are to be avoided.82
Still, some skepticism remains. Several international arbitrators have expressed
apprehension that the sanctions are overly broad in authorizing tribunals to use any
measure necessary.83 Those commentators observe that “any measure necessary” might
equate to “unknown and potentially severe consequences.”84 Other commentators point
78

See generally Crystal & Giannoni-Crystal, supra note 1; see generally Menon, supra note 1; see
generally Park, supra note 1.
79

Sapna Jhangiani & Khaled Moyeed, How Far do the New LCIA Guidelines for Parties’ Legal
Representatives and the IBA Guidelines on Party Representation Go?, K LUWER A RBITRATION B LOG ,
available at http://kluwerarbitrationblog.com/blog/2014/05/21/how-far-do-the-new-lcia-guidelines-forparties-legal-representatives-and-the-iba-guidelines-on-party-representation-go/ (last visited Nov.
25,
2014).
80

See Menon, supra note 1.

81

De Brauw Blackstone Westbroek, LCIA Trailblazer with Introduction of New Ethical Code of Conduct in
2014 Arbitration Rules, available at http://www.debrauw.com/newsletter/lcia-trailblazer-introduction-newethical-code-conduct-2014-arbitration-rules/ (last visited Oct. 24, 2014).
82

See Park, supra note 1, at 425.
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Crowell Moring, The Expediency, Ethics, and Express Powers of the Draft LCIA Arbitration Rules,
available at http://www.crowell.com/NewsEvents/All/The-Expediency-Ethics-and-Express-Powers-of-theDraft-LCIA-Arbitration-Rules. (last visited Nov. 20, 2014).
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to a problem in proving intent.85 Paragraphs 3, 4, and 5 state that legal counsel should
not knowingly engage in specific unethical behavior.86 Paragraph 6 states that legal
counsel should not deliberately engage in specific unethical behavior.87 It is unclear what
level of awareness rises to the level of knowingly or deliberately and whether complaints
leading to sanctions are subject to a particular time frame or other constraint.88 In
general, critics seem to be wary of the ambiguity of the Annex’s language because it
translates to unpredictable outcomes. The legal community prefers stability and
predictability over the unknown, and not knowing how the ethical rules in the Annex will
be applied may cause some hesitation in choosing the LCIA as a forum.89
Another problem debated by commentators is the ambiguity as to the level of
power any international arbitration system or its arbitrators truly should have over
counsel.90 As previously discussed, traditionally, arbitrators, legal counsel, and clients
came from more similar backgrounds and had more of a shared understanding amongst
themselves which lessened the need for arbitrators to control legal counsel and provide
clarification.91 This notion, however, has evolved over time as arbitration has become
more global.92 Even so, the duty to regulate legal counsels’ actions remain unclear. One
tribunal constituted under the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes
(hereinafter “ICSID”) held that international tribunals have “inherent authority”93 to
exercise control over counsel to preserve the integrity of the arbitration.94 Another ICSID
tribunal, however, held that an arbitrator’s power over counsel is limited, and should only
be exercised on rare occasion.95 Even within the same forum, it is uncertain how much
discretion a tribunal may have in checking a legal counsel’s actions.
85

See Waincymer, supra note 64, at 548-549.

86  

LONDON COURT OF INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION R. APP. ¶ 3-5 (2014).

87  

LONDON COURT OF INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION R. APP. ¶ 6 (2014).
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See Waincymer, supra note 64, at 548-549.
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See generally Crystal & Giannoni-Crystal, supra note 1; see generally Park, supra note 1.
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See Bishop & Stevens, supra note 1.
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See generally Park, supra note 1.
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Id.
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Inherent authority used in this context refers to authority possessed implicitly without being derived
from explicit rules or law.

94

See Hrvatska Elektroprivreda d.d. v. Republic of Slovenia, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/24, Order
Concerning the Participation of Counsel (2008) (holding that ICSID tribunal did have power to exclude a
party’s choice of counsel).

95

See Rompetrol Group N.C. v. Romania, ICSID Case ARB/06/3, Decision on the Participation of a
Counsel (2010).
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The IBA Guidelines are more comprehensive and instructive than the LCIA
Annex. The IBA Guidelines articulate twenty-seven rules as compared to five, and the
rules are more detailed. Thus, legal counsel who elect to abide by the IBA will likely feel
they have a better understanding of what to expect as well as a higher expectation of fair
proceedings, both crucial considerations. Another enticing aspect of the IBA Guidelines
is that if parties mutually agree to use it, they sign the Guidelines before arbitration and
therefore it becomes part of the contract to which they are legally bound.96
IBA Guidelines, however, are still weak in certain areas. First, the guidelines
have an opt-in program.97 Parties only have to abide by the Guidelines if they choose for
it to apply before proceedings begin. Second, like the LCIA Annex, the rules for legal
counsel are “should” and “should not” rules. Even if the Guidelines binding through
party agreement, parties could still argue that the Guidelines are merely suggestions
rather than legitimate rules that in the event of noncompliance could subject counsel to
sanctions.
A.  Double Deontology & Inequality-of-Arms
Skepticism about both the LCIA Annex and the IBA Guidelines may add to the
general aversion for any increased ethical regulation in international arbitration. This
opposition may be partially responsible for the overwhelming popularity of the ICC as an
arbitration venue.98 The ICC does not provide any ethical rules for counsel, so lawyers
can largely ascribe to whichever ethical code they choose. However, lawyers are
increasingly acknowledging the negative consequences a lack of ethical guidelines may
have in international arbitration, especially in the face of the growing popularity of
international arbitration around the world.99 A number of leading arbitrators and
practitioners have described the ethical aspects of international arbitration as “a crisis that
can threaten the legitimacy of international arbitration and in need of immediate
redress.”100 Two major concepts have been identified by legal scholars as ethical
challenges facing counsel, “double deontology” and “inequality-of-arms.”101
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Double deontology occurs when a lawyer is bound by more than one set of ethical
requirements that are inconsistent with one another. The attorney is “faced with the
prospect of professional discipline regardless of what action he takes.”102 Theoretically
there are four ways to deal with double deontology: (i) adhere to personal moral standard,
(ii) adhere to the ethical code of the home state, (iii) adhere to the ethical code of the host
state, or (iv) adhere to some third party’s code of conduct.103 The LCIA’s Annex and the
IBA Guidelines are examples of a third party’s code of conduct designed to prevent the
problem of double deontology.104
Inequality-of-arms occurs when “attorneys who are bound by different ethical
rules participate in a single international proceeding” which makes the proceedings
“structurally unfair.”105 Inequality-of-arms is what permits guerrilla tactics to be used,
where one side may use the disparaging rules to gain an advantage against the other
side.106 Inconsistent enforcement of ethical rules among different legal cultures also
plays a part in encouraging guerrilla tactics in international arbitration.107
Several possibilities have been articulated as possible solutions to deciding what
type of ethical code for counsel will solve the problems of double deontology and
inequality-of-arms.108 The most effective approaches to limiting these problems are
promotion of a third party uniform code of ethical regulations, and gaining party
agreement to existing regulations.109 Both of these approaches will prove more effective
than the “no-code” regime of the past, even though the third party uniform code approach
is what the LCIA Annex and the IBA Guidelines seek to promulgate within their forums.
There are significant problems with this approach, however, as illustrated by the “four
flaws” of the LCIA Annex. The rules seem to be suggestions, and expressly provide that
the guidelines are not meant to derogate from any mandatory law, rules of law,
professional rules or codes of conduct. Also, there is “no guarantee that the disciplinary
authorities in the various countries will accept the authority of an international code,”110
especially when the proscribed ethical rules likely contrast with that country’s code.
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The ‘parties’ agreement’ approach may be the most effective remedy. This is a
contractual approach in which the parties would agree beforehand to which ethical code
for counsel will apply to arbitration proceedings.111 The strength of this approach comes
from the concept that the “validity of arbitration flows from the agreement of the
parties.”112 The agreed upon ethical code could be included in the arbitration clause,
similar to the way IBA Rules of Evidence have been adopted in international arbitration
proceedings through the arbitration clause.113 Parties’ agreement provides increased
regulation, but in a way that theoretically benefits all parties involved. If the chosen
ethical code for counsel is expressly contracted for, both parties’ counsel will have a full
understanding of exactly what they can and cannot do, resulting in a leveling of the
playing field, curtailment of guerrilla tactics, increased legitimacy, and overall more
efficient arbitral proceedings.114
More regulation will ensure stability, integrity, and efficiency for parties seeking
arbitration. A practical and effective alternative to the LCIA Annex’s ethical guidelines
is to provide for parties’ agreements which would establish, pre-arbitration, which ethical
code or codes for counsel will apply in proceedings. This can be done efficiently by
adding language to arbitration clauses that provides for which ethical code will apply to
counsel.115 This is already common practice with rules of evidence, and will promote
more transparency and a more level playing field for counsel engaging in international
arbitration.116
VI. CONCLUSION
Some scholars and practitioners may believe that good arbitrators can bridge the
cross-cultural divide with “established rules” and “informal understandings of how things
should be done.”117 That may have been true in the past, but in a growingly complex and
diverse legal world, a “good arbitrator” is not enough.118 One scholar expressed the need
for increased ethical regulations eloquently, “Those lucky enough to be involved only in
111
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smooth arbitrations may ask what the fuss is about, just as a healthy person often has
difficultly understanding the needs of someone sick.”119
Arbitration forums should consider that more ethical regulation may be needed.
More regulation will ensure stability, integrity, and efficiency for parties seeking
arbitration. While the LCIA Annex provides positive ethical proposals for legal
representation, in practice the rules will likely fall short to remedy the current ethical
issues flourishing in international arbitration. There are four flaws that will likely impact
the success of the Annex: (1) the language “shall not” rather than “will not,” (2) the
general disclaimer in Paragraph 1, (3) lack of detail and comprehensiveness, and (4) a
lack of real sanctions.
The LCIA rules came into effect very recently, so time will tell whether the rules
will be successful in ensuring ethical legal representation in the arbitration process.
However, the adoption of the LCIA Annex, even with its flaws, signals that arbitrating
institutions will likely play a larger role in ethical regulation in the future.120
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